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Collaborative consent: Harnessing the strengths of the Internet for
consent in the online environment
Paul Bernal∗
London, UK
Consent in the online environment is a crucial issue at this stage of the development of
the Internet, and at the same time, in practice it is generally dealt with only on a
superﬁcial level. However, while the Internet offers signiﬁcant challenges in terms of
consent, it also provides unparalleled opportunities, which, if grasped, could enable a
new level of consent, particularly where consent is required for services such as
behavioural advertising systems. Through an examination of the failure of Phorm, the
paper introduces a new concept, ‘collaborative consent’, treating consent not as a
discrete, one-off decision but as a collaborative and communicative process, an
ongoing relationship between the individual and the enterprise. The Internet provides
a medium for immediate and interactive communication that could allow information
to be given and choices to be made in real time – a ﬁrst step to real, informed
consent in the online world.
Keywords: consent; Internet; behavioural advertising
Introduction
The current form of the Internet, and in particular the World Wide Web, is one in which the
gathering of data from those who surf has become a key part of the economic model. In
effect, a symbiosis has developed between businesses gathering data and those from
whom the data is gathered; with the data gatherers building business models reliant on
this data and the users becoming dependent on access to free services provided by those
data gatherers, such as search engines, email, social networking platforms and media
provision.1 In this new symbiotic web, an issue that was already of signiﬁcance has
become even more important: the issue of consent. As the scale, scope and nature of the
data gathered from individuals is growing, it has become more important that those from
whom the data is gathered give their consent, not just to the initial gathering of the data
but to the many ways in which it is used. What is more, pressure has built upon data-gath-
erers to avoid having to ask for that consent in a way that might mean that their subject
could or would refuse – for if they do refuse, the business models become less effective,
less proﬁtable, or even unsustainable.
Behavioural advertising epitomises some of these trends – it depends directly on gath-
ering data on those browsing the web, and to a great extent rides roughshod over the whole
idea of consent, treating it superﬁcially at best, and often effectively ignoring it or attempt-
ing to sidestep it entirely. While this is understandable from a business perspective, it has
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also been one of the factors in giving behavioural advertising a somewhat unsavoury
reputation. Phorm is a prime example – for though it had an interesting business idea,
innovative technology, support from the UK government and some powerful business
allies it ultimately seems to have failed. Its failure to address the issue of consent was
one of the key reasons behind its failure.
Was this inevitable? Is it even possible to deal with the issue of consent on the Internet
in anything more than a superﬁcial level? This paper will suggest that it is – and what is
more, that while the Internet offers some signiﬁcant challenges in terms of consent, it
also provides hitherto unparalleled opportunities. If these opportunities are grasped, they
could enable a new level of consent, one that while most directly applicable to behavioural
advertising could also have implications for some of the primary services on the current,
symbiotic Internet, such as email and search engines.
Collaborative consent
A new concept that begins the process of addressing this will be introduced in this paper:
that of ‘collaborative consent’. Collaborative consent has two key aspects. First, it treats
consent not as a discrete, one-off decision but as a process, and second it looks at
consent as a two-way agreement – so that the consenter is allowed and enabled to see
what they have consented to; to monitor, modify or withdraw that consent in real time,
and where the enterprise seeking the consent must communicate and collaborate with the
consenter not just at the start of the process but throughout. Collaborative consent requires
a two-way process, a form of dialogue between the enterprise and the individual. The
Internet provides the kind of medium for immediate and interactive communication that
allows such a process to be possible. This kind of consent could be the most appropriate
and effective if the symbiotic relationship between data gatherers and data subjects is to
be both benign and consensual.
Behavioural targeting and Phorm
Behavioural targeting refers to systems that collect data on web-browsing behaviour – data
which might be searches made, sites visited, or more detailed clickstream data such as the
time of browsing and so forth – usually in order to select which advertisements to display.
Behavioural targeting in one form or other is already common on the Net – among others it
is already used by Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft as well as by specialist advertising and
marketing companies. The system that Phorm developed, Webwise, took behavioural
targeting to a new level, gathering data not just from a small selection of sites and services,
as Google and others do, but from all sites and services except those that speciﬁcally and
actively opt out of the system.
Achieving this depth of monitoring involved two key things: some inventive techno-
logy and close working relationships with cooperative Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
A full technical analysis of the technology is beyond the scope of this paper – though
detailed work has been done on the subject, particularly by Richard Clayton of the
University of Cambridge. As Clayton put it:
The basic concept behind the Phorm architecture is that theywish to take a copy of the trafﬁc that
passes between an end-user and a website. This enables their systems to inspect what requests
were made to the website and to determine what content came back from that website. An
understanding of the types of websites visited is used to target adverts at particular users.2
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Nicholas Bohm, of the Foundation for Information Policy Research, in his detailed legal
analysis of Phorm,3 suggested that the deployment by an ISP of the Phorm architecture
would involve four different forms of illegality, for which the ISP would be primarily
liable and for which Phorm would be liable as an inciter, concerning breaches of the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, the Fraud Act 2006 and the Data
Protection Act 1998, as well as potentially giving the owners of websites spidered by
Phorm actions for false implication, defamation, passing off or trade mark infringement.
The strength of these legal arguments has not yet been tested in court, but some of them
could, to a great extent, be addressed through a better approach to consent. The Regulation
of Investigatory Powers issue was based on the fact that for an interception of communi-
cations to be legal without speciﬁc legal authorisation, both sides would have to agree to
the interception. If the user had properly consented to Phorm’s action that side at least of
the authority would have been clear. The data protection issue could have been immediately
addressed with proper consent. The other two issues, concerning fraud and potential civil
actions by website owners, could also have been addressed through proper consent –
though in this case the consent would have to have come from the owners and operators
of websites, and that is a somewhat different issue, which though of great importance is
not within the scope of this paper.
The fall of Phorm
Hackers, digital rights and privacy groups reacted strongly from the moment the proposed
service became known, not least because of the apparent absence of concern for either
people’s consent or their privacy. The Open Rights Group, among the most respected of
these groups, started a ‘Stop Phorm’ campaign, while Professor Ross Anderson, quoted
in the Evening Standard, said ‘The message has to be this: if you care about your
privacy, do not use BT, Virgin or Talk-Talk as your internet provider’. Tim Berners-Lee
told the BBC that he would change his ISP if it introduced a system like Webwise.
One of the most contentious issues was the discovery that in 2006 and 2007, prior to the
existence of Phorm’s Webwise becoming public, BT had carried out ‘secret’ trials of the
system, involving tens of thousands of end-users. These trials were carried out without
the consent of the end users, and when their existence became public, through a report
leaked onto the Internet, there was not just an outcry from privacy groups but legal investi-
gation. The City of London Police met with BT representatives to informally question them
about the trials and though nothing followed immediately, in February 2010 it was reported
in The Register that the Crown Prosecution Service was considering a criminal prosecution.
Consent once again was the key – and an apparent sense that users’ views and opinions
were neither important nor respected. Phorm’s defence to the attacks consisted mostly
of attempting, with some success, to get the UK government on their side, to keep their
powerful business allies (particularly the three ISPs: BT, Virgin Media, and Talk Talk)
onside, as well as suggesting that they were actually ‘privacy friendly’, since their
records were linked to a randomly generated ‘user identity number’ (UID) rather than to
people’s names or Internet protocol (IP) addresses. This last point remains legally conten-
tious, but in some ways misses the point. As far as the public were concerned, the technical
details did not matter as much as the perception that they were under surveillance and
without their consent – something demonstrated very graphically by the secret trials.
Late in the day, Phorm made it clear that they would operate an ‘opt-in’ system and
would ensure that consent was gained, but for Phorm that was both too little and too
late. Too late, because it appeared to be grudgingly accepted that consent was important
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and too little because even when consent as a concept was accepted, the nature of that
consent was unclear and as discussed above, consent on the Internet, even when gained,
is not as meaningful as it should be – as was graphically demonstrated by the April
Fools’ joke played by Gamestation in which they changed their terms and conditions so
that all of the 7500 people who bought from Gamestation online on 1 April 2010 effectively
consented to the sale of their immortal souls.4
Phorm’s ultimate failure came about for a number of connected reasons. First of all, in
the face of the public outcry a number of crucial websites refused to let it scan them and the
business allies that it had gained abandoned it, depriving the business model of its strength.
As well as that, it faced potential legal action from Europe and investigation from the UK
Ofﬁce of Fair Trading (OFT) and the All Party Parliamentary Communications Group
(apComms).5 However, that failure might have been avoided if it had grasped the nettle
of consent earlier and more positively, and understood that for businesses like this to
succeed, they need to take the public with them. Not only does consent need to be
gained, but that consent needs to be meaningful and understood by the public.
The lessons to learn from Phorm
The Phorm saga illustrates many of the key drives of the current state of the commercial Inter-
net – the desire to target, the purposes of the targeting, the drive to accumulate and use as
much data as possible, the tendency for alliances to build, the sharing of data, the wish to
ﬁnd a way to use data that is being gathered and the difﬁculties surrounding consent. It is
important to understand that though Phorm is perhaps the most extreme to data, it is not
an exception, but more of a representative of other cases. Facebook’s ‘Beacon’ advertising
system through which it shared data with other commercial websites to allow cross-website
targeted advertising, demonstrates many of the same kinds of things, including a lack of
transparency and an initial ‘opt-out’ consent system, and ultimately produced the same
sort of results. Facebook was eventually forced to abandon the system completely, after
settling a class-action law suit that had been brought in California accusing not only
Facebook but a number of its allied retailers of breaching various US wiretapping and
privacy laws.6
As noted above, there is another way of looking at the reasons that Phorm, and
Facebook’s Beacon, ultimately failed – by looking at the symbiosis that exists on the
web. Symbiosis succeeds when both sides of the symbiotic relationship beneﬁt. Google’s
model, which epitomises this symbiosis, offer something new or improved in return for
information or monitoring – useful services such as search, email or YouTube. That is
true even for their more apparently intrusive services like Google StreetView. The users
get some kind of beneﬁt in return for the intrusion or the gathering of personal data – so
the symbiosis is in balance. With Phorm (and Beacon) the opposite is the case – only
Phorm and its advertising partners stand to beneﬁt. Phorm does not improve the services,
or offer anything new to the user, but just uses existing services and acts in a way that
could even be described as parasitic. Phorm takes, but gives little in return – and in a
world in which the value of data is becoming increasingly understood, not just by businesses
but by individuals, this, in the end, cannot work and hence Phorm failed. It failed in a painful
way for almost all concerned, and particularly for Phorm itself and the UK government. That
pain could have been reduced, or even avoided, if the situation had been better understood.
What is more, if the issue of consent had been grasped, the nature of the imbalance in the
relationship would have been revealed – for if people are to consent to something, they
need to be convinced that there is some beneﬁt to them.
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Consent
This makes it crucial that the issue of consent is understood better and engaged with
directly. At present it is an issue that is often sidestepped, or treated in such way as to
make it mere legal form rather than having any real connection with what would be under-
stood in any ‘real world’ sense as ‘consent’. The Data Protection Directive talks about
‘express, informed consent’ – but what do we mean by ‘express’ and ‘informed’? On
the Internet, the kind of consent generally gained is by a user scrolling down a long
page of writing that they do not read (and might not understand even if they did read)
and then clicking ‘OK’ at the end to conﬁrm that they have ‘read and understood’ the
terms and conditions. The information thus presented (but rarely read) is deemed to
make the consent ‘informed’, while the clicking of OK is deemed to make it ‘express’.
This ‘click–wrap consent’ has been generally found to be legally acceptable, though the
key cases have mostly been brought in the United States7 – but in a more real or ethical
sense it is close to meaningless. Lord Denning, in Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking, referring
back to a number of earlier cases,8 suggested that ‘no customer in a thousand’ ever reads
the terms and conditions put in small print on a ticket, something that might be equally
said about click–wrap contracts – as the Gamestation April Fools’ joke referred to
above revealed dramatically.
The kind of ‘browse–wrap’ consent used by Google and others is less legally compel-
ling. As the Article 29 Working Party has suggested, where search engines are concerned,
ordinary, anonymous users cannot be considered to have given consent and the ‘de facto
contractual relationship’ when using a search engine in its usual form ‘does not meet
the strict limitation of necessity as required in the Directive’.9 Further cases in Britain
and Europe, such as Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking, and the Italian case of Playstation
(Tribunal of Bolzano, 31 December 2003), follow a related logic, suggesting that license
conditions added after the purchase of goods or services are unenforceable – it might be
considered that the kinds of conditions set by the Google, which are accessible only if
a user follows a series of links from the Google home page, would be similarly
unenforceable.
Many businesses operating on the Internet stretch the consent issue even further, setting
their terms and conditions so that by ‘signing in’ to one service, a user consents to having
their data gathered and aggregated for other services provided by the same company. If a
user signs in to GoogleMail, for example, and then subsequently uses any of the other
Google services (from Google Search to Google Maps to YouTube, etc.), then data is gath-
ered about what is searched for or any places examined in Google Maps, and aggregated
with the data record of the individual signed in to GoogleMail. As Google puts it in its
privacy policy:
We may combine the information that you submit under your account with information from
other Google services or third parties, in order to provide you with a better experience and to
improve the quality of our services. For certain services, we may give you the opportunity to
opt out of combining such information.10
Whether or not this is legal has not been tested in court, but it is at least something for which
an argument can be made. Google, however, do not deﬁne precisely which services it is
talking about – and not all ‘Google services’ are labelled with the Google name,
YouTube being the most obvious example. If a user is signed in to GoogleMail, does
that mean that they have consented to having their YouTube activities monitored and aggre-
gated with their GoogleMail data? YouTube has separate accounts that can be individually
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signed in, but will data still be aggregated? A further signiﬁcant question is whether people
understand the linkages between the different services, even if they all bear the same labels
– are they aware that by signing in to GoogleMail they are giving Google the legal green
light to gather data from all of their services? It does not seem very likely, except for the
most ‘savvy’ of surfers. What is true of Google is equally true of the other big Internet com-
panies such as Yahoo and Microsoft, all of whom have a raft of different services with the
capability to monitor and gather different kinds of information if consent has been given
through signing in to just one of their services.
The main issue, therefore, is not what kind of consent is currently legal, but the more
fundamental issues, and how the law can be used to make sure that legal consent more
closely resembles ‘real’ consent, in the sense that it relates to having made an informed,
autonomous decision.
Assumed consent – and opt-in/opt out
The question of when consent is required is also both a legal question and an ethical one.
From a legal perspective, the determining factor is generally whether assuming consent is
‘reasonable’. In the RIPA (Section 3(1)) for example, as shown through Phorm, interception
of communications could be lawful if there are ‘reasonable grounds’ to assume the
communicators’ consent. The question, therefore, becomes what is ‘reasonable’. At the
very least, it is clearly unreasonable to assume that someone will consent to things that
most members of a society reject. Where there is doubt, further questions must be asked
and further information sought before consent may be assumed – and while doubt still
exists consent cannot be assumed. Taking this a step further, it can be argued that if it is
‘normal’ in a society for something to be acceptable, then using an opt-out consent
system might be acceptable, but if it is normal in society for something to be unacceptable,
then an ‘opt-in’ system is crucial. As before, where there is any doubt about whether
something is acceptable or unacceptable, the rights of the individual should get the
beneﬁt of the doubt, and only an ‘opt-in’ system should be possible.
Behavioural advertisers appear to have a very different understanding of the underlying
level of consent to their systems. The behavioural targeting systems of the main players in
the Internet world, Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft, all work on an opt-out basis. When
Phorm ﬁrst mooted their system, they left the question of opt-in/opt-out up to the ISPs, see-
mingly not considering it that important a question and leaving the impression to many that
they thought opt-out was probably the most likely solution. The actions of all of them
suggest that they believe that, in general, behavioural tracking is not just acceptable, but
in fact would be supported by users – while the views of privacy advocates, supported
by the ﬁrst detailed academic survey of behavioural advertising, in a 2009 report by the
University of Pennsylvania, suggest the opposite.11 Indeed, that survey makes it clear
that American society as a whole does not ﬁnd behavioural tracking and the advertising
associated with it, to be generally acceptable. The survey covers attitudes in America,
but in the absence of similarly convincing studies of attitudes in Europe or the UK, at
the very least the opposite – that society accepts and supports behavioural tracking –
cannot be assumed. The logical consequence is that opt-in rather than opt-out systems
are currently a necessity.
Google’s Global Privacy Counsel, Peter Fleischer, speaking at the Computers, Privacy
and Data Protection Conference in Brussels in January 2010, suggested that the question of
‘opt-out, opt-in’ is a bit of a red herring, for two reasons: ﬁrst, because even opting in is
often not very meaningful, as people just scroll and click, without understanding – once
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again recalling Lord Denning’s remarks in Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking; second, because
it cannot be expected for one company (in his case Google) to take the opt-in route unilat-
erally, as it would be effectively shooting itself in the foot. The second objection would be
by-passed by a legal requirement for opt-in rather than opt-out. The ﬁrst objection is a much
more important one – but the consequence of it should surely not be that the idea of opt-in
should be abandoned, but that a way needs to be found for opting-in (and indeed all forms
of consent) to become more meaningful.
Looking at it from the other direction, when can consent from websites to being scanned
by businesses like Phorm be assumed? In assuming that its analysis of websites was accep-
table, Phorm made strong assumptions about the public nature of the Internet. Essentially,
Phorm was assuming that by allowing their websites to be searched by search engines like
Google, website owners are giving anyone freedom to examine, analyse and potentially
make proﬁts from those websites. By assuming that no speciﬁc consent would be requited
for this, Phorm are assuming that society – in this case what might be described as ‘web
society’, including both individual web-surfers and those who provide websites – have
consented to this on an overall level, and hence do not need to ‘opt in’ to their system.
Has ‘web society’ done this? It is a big assumption to make and one not currently supported
by convincing evidence. If behavioural trackers wish to make their services opt-out rather
than opt-in, then they need to provide convincing evidence that this is what society in
general supports.
The ﬁrst step towards getting this kind of acceptance of behavioural tracking and other,
similar monitoring or tracking services, could be to promote a better understanding of the
positive aspects of the symbiotic relationship of the current state of the web. That, however,
would place a duty on the commercial enterprises to be honest about how and why they
gather data. At present they appear to wish to short-cut the process, to assume consent
before those they are asking to consent have even begun to understand what they are
consenting to – perhaps for fear that if the ‘consenters’ do understand what is going on,
they will withdraw their consent, as evidence from cases like Phorm and Beacon, and
surveys like that reported in the 2009 University of Pennsylvania study suggest they might.
Informed consent
One of the strongest principles of the Data Protection Directive is the requirement for
informed consent. That raises an immediate question – what does it mean for consent to
be ‘informed’? There are two very different ways to look at it – does ‘informed’ just
mean that information has to be given, or does it mean that an ‘informed decision’ needs
to be enabled, a decision where the information has not only been given but has been under-
stood, and that understanding has been conﬁrmed. The former, where information is given,
is what generally happens on the Internet – the information that users scroll down without
reading before clicking ‘OK’ can be said to have been given, but it is rarely read, let alone
understood – once more recalling Lord Denning’s ‘no customer in a thousand’. The latter,
where information is not only given but understood, and a genuinely informed decision is
enabled, is what anyone interested in autonomy would demand.
How can this kind of an ‘informed’ decision be enabled? In the ﬁeld of medical law the
concept of informed consent has been investigated and discussed in depth. Harvey Teff
introduced a concept he called ‘collaborative autonomy’ to ﬁnd a way through the maze
of ethical and medical problems surrounding the need for and meaning of ‘informed
consent’. Teff suggests a process of communication, a dialogue, through which more
complex issues are discussed until they are understood, and as the situation develops and
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the patient’s understanding and views develop, the decision as to whether to continue with
treatment or change direction can be made in a manner that is both better informed and more
ﬂexible. As he puts it:
What many patients seek is sufﬁcient understanding to reach an ‘informed’ decision in the
fuller sense of the term; this can seldom be achieved without the kind of dialogue, and the
kind of relationship, to which the collaborative model of medical practice alone aspires.12
Though the issues involved in medical consent are somewhat different to those on the Inter-
net, there are many similarities and a similarly collaborative model is possible. The idea that
consent should be a dialogue, a process rather than a one-off decision based on ﬁxed, pro-
vided information, is something of particular relevance in cases like Phorm and can be taken
a step further – for what is being consented to is a continuing process rather than a single
discrete event and that places particular demands on consent. Furthermore, this does not just
apply to systems like Phorm, for though search engines, for example, may appear to work as
series of discrete events – individual searches producing individual results – they are better
looked at as a network of linked events. The search engine provider not only records what a
user searches for and the results they get, but how the user follows through those results,
both in terms of links clicked but also in terms of what the user searches for next and so
forth, building up a constantly developing and evolving proﬁle. Is this something that
can be adequately covered by individual, discrete acts of consent? Consenting for the
individual operation might be something very different from consent to the whole
process, to the aggregation and proﬁling, to the analysis and all that follows. What is
true for search engines is also true for many of the most popular systems and services in
the current form of the Net – social networking platforms, email services, blog services
and so forth. They are not the discrete, individual, often trivial events so much as longer
term, continuous processes.
How can this be addressed? One part of the answer may lie in the nature of the Internet
itself. The Internet is a communications medium and one that lends itself ideally to commu-
nicative processes – and a medium in which collaboration is becoming one of the key ways
of working, particularly with the rise of Web 2.0. Wikis are a prime example of both
collaboration and communication – while the essence of social networking is sharing,
blogs function at their best with comments and conversations attached to them, and so
forth. When the symbiotic nature of the current commercial Internet is considered, that sug-
gestion becomes even more emphatic. For a beneﬁcial symbiosis both sides must beneﬁt,
and that means that what is required is active collaboration between the users and the enter-
prises gathering the data – the kind of symbiotic active regulatory matrix described in
Murray’s theory of Symbiotic Regulation.13
What is more, the Internet is an ‘informative’ system – an unparalleled system for
provision, communication and veriﬁcation of information. That ability to inform should
be harnessed for the purposes of ‘informed’ consent. Further, the Internet is an interactive
medium, and a ‘real-time’ medium – so consent has the potential to become an interactive
process, working in real-time. When these different aspects are combined, the Internet can
allow a very different form of consent.
Collaborative consent
The unparalleled communicative, collaborative, informative and real-time interactive
opportunities presented by the Internet can be harnessed to produce a different kind of
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consent – a form of consent that allows informed decisions, and a real opportunity for those
decisions to be expressed. Using the communicative potential of the Internet can allow
consent to become much more of a collaboration between those gathering data or
monitoring users and the users themselves – and one that operates interactively, in real
time, just as the Internet itself is used interactively, in real time, again, echoing the
dynamic model in Murray’s theory of symbiotic regulation.
The starting point is to ensure that contracts, Terms and Conditions, End User Licence
Agreements and so forth are written in plain, understandable language. Agreed and standar-
dised terms for certain forms of activity should be used, and compliance with agreed
minimum standards as to what can and cannot be consented to required – it would not
just be the selling of a user’s soul in perpetuity, as suggested jokily by Gamestation, that
would be impossible. Technical language like Deep Packet Inspection must be described
in terms that explain their impact in a way that ordinary users might be able to understand.
These contracts would be designed as much to inform the user – to communicate – as they
would be to satisfy legal obligations.
The work of the creators of Copyleft, and the Creative Commons movement with their
three-part license – the machine readable code, the legal code and essentially the human
readable code – give us some clues as to how this kind of thing might work. At a practical
level, the code of practice for Privacy Notices issued by the Information Commissioner’s
Ofﬁce (ICO) could also provide a useful starting point. Both the privacy notices themselves
and the code of practice concerning them are intended to be communicative, and begin the
process of using the communications opportunities of the Internet in a positive way. As the
ICO puts it:
It’s a lot easier to actively communicate a privacy notice in an online context than in a ‘bricks
and mortar one. You should make full use of the technology available to you to promote trans-
parency and fairness.14
Collaborative consent would take this a step further, using the online context not just to
communicate such things as privacy notices, but to include the whole consent process.
The provider of a service would engage in a direct dialogue with the user, telling that
user all the relevant information as it happens, alerting the user to important changes as
they happen, and needing to get direct responses before taking any action. Those kinds
of changes could be when new services come online – for example, if a user was signed
in to one service provided by a provider and visited another service provided by the
same provider, they would be alerted to the fact that this service was now gathering data
and given the option to ‘turn off’ that gathering process.
The dialogue would be supported by further, back-up information – in particular, infor-
mation about what data is being gathered (and has been gathered) and how it is being used.
It is important to remember that this whole process should be a real-time process, and a
continuous one – and that consent, once given, should not be considered to apply
forever without the user being aware of what is happening. When data is being gathered,
the data subject should be being told at all times – the precise method of the alert would
depend on the nature of the service. This kind of a system would allow options to be
provided wherever possible – so that consent is not a simple ‘yes or no’ to everything,
but that a user can choose a level of consent and a corresponding level of privacy, depend-
ing on their personal views, opinion of the data gatherer and even the nature of their surﬁng
at that particular time.
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Google has already begun providing some of this kind of information to those users
perspicacious enough to search for it; their dashboard system allows Google account
holders to see what data has been gathered about them from which Google services,
while their Google Ads Preferences allow users to see some of how Google has used this
data in terms of what ‘interest categories’ Google has placed them in for advertising pur-
poses.15 Google Ads Preferences allows users to modify their proﬁles, enable or disable
the receipt of targeted advertising, decide whether or how their data might be shared and
so forth. If Google can do this, why not other data gatherers? If Google can make the infor-
mation available indirectly, through a set of links via their privacy centre or their advertising
system, why should they not make it available immediately and directly, and in a user-
friendly and interactive way?
Once again, Lord Denning in Thornton provides some clues to the way forward, when
he suggested that in order to give sufﬁcient notice to particularly important and contentious
points in the terms and conditions. They would ‘need to be printed in red ink with a red hand
pointing to it – or something similarly startling’. While Lord Denning’s remarks were not
really intended as a practical suggestion, on the Internet they could become reality –
indeed, the red hand could be illustrated, animated and accompanied by ﬂashing lights
and wailing sirens.
The key elements of collaborative consent should be seen as rights: rights to be
informed, rights to be consulted, rights to withdraw consent, rights to question and so
forth. The principal features of this kind of an approach – most directly that it should
provide a regular reminder that monitoring is taking place and give the user the option to
withdraw or modify consent – provide a strong step towards supporting the continuation
and development of the positive aspects of the symbiotic nature of the current web. If
those who are monitoring and targeting people require continued consent from those
being monitored and targeted, then they will need to communicate the beneﬁts that those
being monitored and targeted are getting. In order to communicate that beneﬁt, they ﬁrst
need to ensure that a beneﬁt really exists, not just in the minds of the providers, but one
that the user can understand and appreciate – and hence that the symbiosis is a beneﬁcial
rather than parasitical one. That, viewed from this perspective, was the problem with
Phorm’s Webwise.
A ﬁrst step
Behavioural tracking is one of the Internet technologies of most interest to those concerned
with privacy and autonomy, but it is only one example of what might be possible. While it is
not possible to fully anticipate technological developments, it is likely that consent will
remain a key issue as the Internet develops. It is important that it is not an issue that is
dropped because it is ‘difﬁcult’ to produce meaningful consent, but is engaged with directly
and ways found to address it. Making consent a collaborative process, one that puts
demands on those gathering data to both explain and ensure that there are beneﬁts from
the data gathering for those about whom the data is being gathered, could be a useful
ﬁrst step.
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